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Green Taxes and the WTO:
Creating Certainty for the Future
Mark Liang*
I. INTRODUCTION
On August 21, 2008, China announced a tax that classifies vehicles by
engine size, taxing larger engine vehicles at a higher rate than vehicles with
smaller engines.' It is anticipated that the tax will disproportionately affect
imported vehicles, since imported vehicles in China tend to have larger engines.
Consequently, the US and EU, two major exporters of large engine vehicles to
China, are expected to file a World Trade Organization ("WTO") complaine
alleging that China's engine size tax violates Article 111:2 of the General
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs ("GATT"), which bars discriminatory tax
measures.
3
Article II1 of the GATT implements the nondiscrimination doctrine. The
nondiscrimination doctrine obligates WTO members to treat competing
domestic and foreign products equally with respect to internal (nontariff)
taxation.4 However, the precise reach of Article 111:2 in regulating members'
authority to impose internal taxes on industries and products is unclear under
BASc 2007, University of Toronto; JD Candidate 2010, University of Chicago Law School. The
author would like to thank Stephanie Holmes, Cathy Hwang, and Jeffrey Oliver for their
contributions and insights.
I Car Taxes in China: Taking Another Road, The Economist (Aug 21, 2008), available online at
<http://www.economist.com/business/displaystory.cfm?story.id=11967001> (visited Apr 23,
2009).
2 Id. See also Simon Lester, Taxing Big Engine Cars, International Economic Law and Policy Blog
(Aug 24, 2008), available online at <http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/ 200 8/O8/gas-
guzzlers.html> (visited Apr 22, 2009).
3 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 61 Stat A-11, TIAS 1700, 55 UN Treaty Set 194 (1947),
art 111:2 ("GAIT').
4 Nicholas DiMascio and Joost Pauwelyn, Nondiscrimination in Trade and Investment Treaties: Worlds
Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 102 Am J Intl L 48, 59-60 (2008).
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existing WTO jurisprudence.' Confusion over Article 111:2's reach will become
problematic in light of current global concerns over climate change and energy
shortages. In response to these environmental and energy concerns, nations are
expected to promulgate green taxes that incentivize lower energy consumption
and emissions.6 These green taxes may be facially nondiscriminatory since they
are unlikely to explicitly classify and tax products by national origin. However,
green taxes may in effect impact importing nations disproportionately, thereby
raising issues about compliance with Article 111:2. China's engine size tax creates
precisely this dilemma of disproportionately impacting imports, thereby risking
noncompliance with Article 111:2.
To further complicate matters, GATT Article XX permits various
enumerated exceptions to other GATT provisions, including Article III's
nondiscrimination provisions. Of particular relevance are Article XX(b) and (g).
Together, Article XX(b) and (g) articulate Article XX's environmental
exceptions However, the scope of Article XX has been limited by its preamble,
or chapeau.8 The chapeau ensures that Article XX is not abused by member
states to avoid GATT obligations.9
China's engine size tax might present the first of what will likely be many
green tax disputes in the coming years. The interplay between Article 111:2,
environmental concerns, and Article XX is expected to create numerous and
difficult WTO disputes. The WTO's possible adjudication of a dispute
concerning China's engine size tax would set important precedent. This
Comment seeks to determine what types of green taxes should be acceptable
given the WTO's case law, and what factors should be relevant to this
determination.
The Comment is divided into seven sections. Section II explores the
confusion surrounding the WTO's jurisprudence over Article 111:2. Section III
discusses Article XX's exemptions from the GATT and Article III, particularly
the environmental exemptions embodied in Articles XX(b) and XX(g), and
explains how Article XX's chapeau narrows the scope of these exemptions.
Section IV discusses the WTO's adoption of the "precautionary principle" and
how this doctrine may signal greater WTO deference to domestic environmental
policies. Section V merges the previous three parts and advocates for a step-by-
step test that a WTO Panel should use in evaluating a "green tax" dispute.
5 Id.
6 See, for example, Car Taxes in China, The Economist (cited in note 1).
7 GATT, art XX(b), art XX(g).
8 Dukgeun Ahn, Environmental Disputes in the GATT/I WTO Beore and After US-Shrimp Case, 20 Mich
J Intl L 819, 833 (1999).
9 Id.
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Section VI applies this proposed test to the Chinese engine size tax and draws
some conclusions on what types of green taxes will comply with the GATT.
Section VII concludes that facially neutral green taxes should usually be upheld
by the WTO.
II. GATT ARTICLE 111:2
Article 111:2 presents a potential obstacle to green taxes by prohibiting all
internal or nontariff tax measures that discriminate against foreign imports.
Article 111:2 provides,
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or
indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of
those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products. Moreover, no
contracting party shall otherwise apply internal taxes or other internal
charges to imported or domestic products in a manner contrary to the
principles set forth in paragraph 1.10
Article III embodies the nondiscrimination or "national treatment" provision of
the GATT." The national treatment doctrine stands for the proposition that
nations must not place foreign imported goods at an economic disadvantage to
domestic goods. That is, the doctrine requires nations to put domestic and
imported goods on equal competitive footing. 12 Article 111:2 addresses internal
or nontariff taxes. Consider an archetypical Article 111:2 violation where Country
A passes a tax that explicitly imposes a sales tax rate of 50 percent on all foreign
imported beef and a 10 percent rate on all domestic beef. Such a statute would
violate Article 111:2 since it clearly imposes a higher and therefore discriminatory
internal tax on foreign imports. Country A's tax, which explicitly places a higher
tax burden on foreign imports, is considered de jure discriminatory, or, facially
discriminatory. 3 Facially discriminatory taxes are plain violations of Article 111:2.
A. DE FACTO DISCRIMINATION
Complex Article 111:2 cases arise over disputes concerning non-facially
discriminative taxes. These taxes are not explicitly set based on the national
origin of the goods.14 However, such non-facially discriminatory measures are de
10 GATT, art 111:2.
11 DiMascio and Pauwelyn, 102 Am J Intl L at 59-60 (cited in note 4).
12 Id.
13 Henrik Horn and Petros C. Mavroidis, Still HaV after All These Years: The Interpretation of National
Treatment in the GATTIWTO Case-Law on Tax Discrimination, 15 EurJ Ind L 39, 60 (2004).
14 Won Mog Choi, Overcoming the 'Aim and Effect" Theory: Interpretation of 'like Product" in GAIT
Article III, 8 UC Davis J Intl L & Poly 107, 116 (2002).
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facto discriminatory if the effect of the taxation scheme discriminates against
foreign imports.'5 Thus, while a de facto discriminatory tax does not explicitly
discriminate against imports, the tax may effectively impose a higher tax rate on
goods that tend to be imported, thereby having a discriminatory effect on
imports.
The WTO's jurisprudence concerning non-facially discriminatory taxation
schemes reveals no per se rule. For example, in United States-Taxes on Automobiles
("US-Autos'), the EU argued that the US "gas guzzler tax" was de facto
discriminatory since, as a factual matter, EU auto exports to the US tended to
have lower gas mileage and would be disproportionately affected by the tax. 6
The WTO Dispute Panel nevertheless found the US gas guzzler tax in
compliance with Article 111:2. Other cases have similarly held that non-facially
discriminatory tax measures that disproportionately impacted foreign imports
were in compliance with Article III:2."7 By contrast, the WTO has also found
non-facially discriminatory tax measures in violation of Article 111:2.'8 The
conflicting results of these cases indicate that there is no per se rule on taxes that
are not facially discriminatory, but are discriminatory in effect.
The WTO's lack of a per se rule on non-facially discriminatory taxes
strikes a balance between respecting member states' political autonomy and
preventing circumvention of Article III:2's intent to enforce the national
treatment doctrine. However, an analysis of the WTO's jurisprudence reveals
not only that there is no bright-line rule that governs alleged de facto
discrimination disputes, but also that there is a lack of consistent guidelines or
factors. The WTO has stated that Article 111:2 disputes concerning non-facially
discriminatory taxes must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. 9 Such an
'5 See World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, Chile-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages
25, WTO Doc No WT/DS87/AB/R, WT/DS110/AB/R (Dec 13, 1999) ("Chile-Alcoholic
Beverages?'; World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages 29, WTO Doc No WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (Oct 4, 1996)
("Japan-Alcoholic Beverages").
16 World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel, United States-Taxes on Automobiles 3.29, WTO
Doc No DS31/R (Sept 30, 1994) ("US-Autos.
17 See World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel, United States-Taxes on Petroleum and Certain
Imported Substances, WTO Doc No BISD/34S/136, L/6175 (June 17, 1987); World Trade
Organization, Report of the Panel, Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on
Cigarettes, WTO Doc No BISD/37S/200, DS10/R (Nov 7, 1990).
is See World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, Canada-Certain Measures Concerning
Periodicals, WT/DS31/AB/R (June 30, 1997) ("Canada-Periodicals; Chik-Alcohoic Beverages,
Report of the Appellate Body; Japan-Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body.
19 Raj Bhala, The Precedent Setters: De Facto Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication (Part Two of a Trilogy), 9 J
Trans L & Poly 1, 100-01 (1999). See also Japan-Alcoho'c Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body
at 20.
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individualized and fact-intensive inquiry is problematic. Member states face
constant doubts over whether any given or proposed tax risks being struck
down by the WTO as a violation of Article 111:2. It is costly for member states
to have to check Article 111:2 compliance and investigate the impact a proposed
tax will have on imports relative to domestic goods.
An analysis of WTO jurisprudence on Article 111:2 does suggest that
certain considerations are relevant. These considerations include: (1) the
likelihood and extent of the disproportionate impact on foreign imports, and (2)
whether the tax measure has a graduated progression of tax rates based on
product classifications motivated by legitimate policy goals. A member state's tax
only complies with Article 111:2 if it complies with both the first and second
sentence of Article 111:2. A discussion of each Article 111:2 sentence follows
below.
B. ANALYSIS OF ARTICLE III:2'S FIRST SENTENCE
Article III:2's first sentence has been the subject of much confusion in
WTO disputes. The sentence states: "The products of the territory of any
contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall
not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of
any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic
products. 20  Most Article 111:2 disputes turn on the Dispute Body's
interpretation of the word "like."21 In typical Article 111:2 disputes, the
complainant country will argue that the defendant country is taxing the
complainant's imported products at a higher rate than defendant's "like"
domestic products.22 The "like" inquiry often determines the outcome of Article
111:2 cases. Once a foreign product is considered "like" a domestic product, the
mere showing that the foreign product is taxed "in excess of" of the "like"
domestic good is sufficient to show an Article 111:2 violation.
23
Broadly speaking, imported and domestic products are "like" each other if
they share similar characteristics that suggest consumers in the defendant nation
would be expected to make purchasing decisions between them.24 Intuitively,
two products are "like" if consumers consider them to be comparable goods
that meet the same consumer needs. The "like" inquiry becomes complicated
20 GATr, art 111:2.
21 See, for example, Canada-Periodicals, Report of the Appellate Body.
22 Id.
23 Japan--ALcoholc Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body at 20 (explaining de minimis defense does
not apply to "in excess of"; any amount higher is sufficient).
24 See Canada-Periodicals, Report of the Appellate Body at 29.
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with non-facially discriminative taxes. In US-Autos, the US gas guzzler tax set
rates based on gas mileage. The EU complained that this tax disproportionately
affected EU export vehicles in the US since their exports tended to have lower
gas mileage.25 The US countered on lack of "likeness" grounds arguing that low-
and high-gas mileage vehicles were not "like" products. 26 For example, vehicles
with a sub-12.5 miles per gallon ("mpg") rating facing a $7,700 tax did not
compete with 22.5 and higher mpg-rated vehicles facing no tax.27 The Panel
agreed with the US argument. High- and low-mileage vehicles were sufficiently
distinct and noncompetitive that they were not "like. 28
Other past Article 111:2 disputes further illustrate the complexity and fact-
intensive nature of the likeness inquiry.29 These disputes present the same
archetypical facts. Defendant nation's tax divides a broad category of products
into certain origin-neutral classifications. Each classification will be taxed at a
class-specific rate and the classifications taxed at higher rates will tend to be
imports. The key inquiry is whether the individual classifications of products are
sufficiently similar and competitive to be considered "like."3 If so, then the
complainant and defendant's products are considered "like."
A review of the WTO's jurisprudence on Article 111:2's first sentence
presents two competing "likeness" tests: (1) the "border tax adjustment factors"
test and (2) the "aims and effects" test.31
The border tax adjustment factors test employs the following factors in
determining whether two products are "like": (i) whether the products' end uses
are the same or similar; (ii) consumers tastes and habits; (iii) the products'
properties, nature, and quality; and (iv) whether tariff schemes typically
categorize the products as part of the same classification.32 The border tax
adjustment factors focus on whether defendant nation's internal taxation scheme
is likely to result in a disparate tax burden on foreign goods. If so, then the two
products are "like." The test is objective. It does not conduct a subjective inquiry




29 Chile-Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body (whether alcoholic beverages with content
below 35' were like beverages above 39"); Japan--Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body
(whether various types of alcoholic beverages were like).
30 See Japan-Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body 21-22.
31 Choi, 9 UC Davis J Ind L & Poly at 111 (cited in note 14).
32 Reinhard Quick and Christian Lau, Environmentaly Motivated Tax Distinctions and W'FO Law, 6 J Intl
Econ L 419,428 (2003).
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into the motivation underlying the disputed tax.33 Rather, it inquires only into the
tax's likely market effect, with some analysis into similarity of the products'
features and qualities. The Appellate Body applied the border tax adjustment
factors in Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages ("Japan-Alcoholic Beverages"),
anticipating that consumers would shift more of their purchases to domestically
produced beverages and away from foreign beverage types as a result of the
tax. 4 The end uses of the beverages were the same and the Appellate Body
found that the beverages' properties were sufficiently similar.35
In contrast to the "border tax adjustment factors" test, the "aims and
effects" test considers (i) the market effect of the defendant nation's tax
measure, and (ii) the purpose underlying the tax measure.36 The purpose half of
the inquiry makes the test more subjective than the border tax adjustment
factors test. Under the aims and effects test, if a tax measure's aim is to
effectively tax imports at a higher rate and the measure achieves this aim, then
the two products are "like." The aims of a tax measure are primarily determined
by investigating the tax measure's legislative history.37 The WTO applied the
aims and effects test in US-Autos and concluded complainant parties were
unable to demonstrate that defendant US had any protectionist intent in
implementing the gas guzzler tax.38 The panel noted that even if complainant
parties had demonstrated that the tax disproportionately burdened imports and
thus had discriminatory impact, they had failed to demonstrate discriminatory
purposes underlying the tax measure. 39 Because the US did not intend to
discriminate against foreign imports, the US did not treat the pertinent foreign
and domestic products as "like." Therefore, the products were not "like" and the
disputed tax did not violate Article III:2's first sentence.4 °
US-Autos demonstrates that while the aims and effects test is more
subjective than the objective border tax adjustment factors test, the test is less
intrusive of member states' autonomy than the border tax adjustment factors.41
The aims and effects test adds another prong or burden of proof that
complainant must satisfy. Namely, in addition to proving discriminatory market
33 DiMascio and Pauwelyn, 102 Am J Intl L at 63 (cited in note 4).
34 Report of the Appellate Body, Japan-Acoholic Beverages at 20, 22-23.
35 Id.
36 Elizabeth Trujillo, Mission Possible: Recipral Deference between Domestic Regulatory Structures and the
WTO, 40 Cornell Ind L J 201, 219-20 (2007).




41 DiMascio and Pauwelyn, 102 AmJ Intl L at 63 (cited in note 4).
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impact, the complainant must also prove discriminatory intent. Discriminatory
effect alone is insufficient to create a finding of "likeness" under the aims and
effects test.
42
C. ANALYSIS OF ARTICLE III:2's SECOND SENTENCE
Article III:2's second sentence provides a separate distinct requirement
from the first sentence that the promulgating state must satisfy in order to avoid
an Article 111:2 violation. Article III:2's second sentence states: "no contracting
party shall otherwise apply internal taxes or other internal charges to imported or
domestic products in a manner contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph
1.,, 43 The second sentence references Paragraph 1 of Article III, thereby
requiring member states to comply with the provisions of Article 111:1. 44 The
Appellate Body has laid out a three-step inquiry for determining whether a
member state's tax regime complies with Article 11I:2's second sentence: (1)
whether the pertinent foreign and domestic products are directly competitive or
substitutable, (2) whether the foreign and domestic products are not similarly
taxed, and (3) whether the tax differential was meant to afford protection to
domestic production.45 While both Article 111:2 sentences attempt to get at the
same idea of preventing discriminatory taxation, there are differences in their
respective requirements. In short, the directly competitive or substitutable
inquiry is broader and more favorable to a complainant nation than the "like"
inquiry. However, the second sentence is also less favorable to a complainant
nation by offering a defendant nation de minimis and good-faith defenses.
The first step of the Article 111:2 second sentence inquiry is whether the
pertinent foreign and domestic products are directly competitive or
substitutable. This inquiry considers the following non-exhaustive list of factors:
(i) elasticity of demand, (ii) elasticity of substitution, (iii) end-uses, (iv)
consumers' tastes and habits, and (v) the products' properties and nature.46 The
foregoing list shares many of the same considerations as the border tax
42 Steve Charnovitz, The Law of Environmental 'TPMS" in the WITO: Debunking the Myth of Illegaiy, 27
Yale J Ind L 59, 89 (2002).
43 GAIT, art 111:2.
44 Article III:l provides: "The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other internal
charges, and laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale,
purchase, transportation, distribution or use of products, and internal quantitative regulations
requiring the mixture, processing or use of products in specified amounts or proportions, should
not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic
production." GATr, art 111:1.
45 See Canada-Periodicals, Report of the Appellate Body; Japan-Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the
Appellate Body.
46 Horn and Mavroidis, 15 EurJ Ind L at 52 (cited in note 13).
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adjustment factors test for likeness. As Japan-Alcoholic Beverages and other cases47
find, though, the directly competitive or substitutable inquiry is broader than the
"like" inquiry of the Article 111:2 first sentence. That is, it is easier to show two
products are directly competitive or substitutable than to find that they are
"like." The distinction between "like" and directly competitive or substitutable is
that the directly competitive or substitutable inquiry considers elasticity of
demand and substitution. If taxing the foreign product at a higher rate is likely to
lead to a shifting of consumer preference to the domestic product, then the two
products are directly competitive or substitutable. For example, fish and carrots
are not "like" given their different physical characteristics and end uses since
they serve different dietary needs. Consumers would not view fish and carrots as
comparable goods between which they make purchasing decisions. However,
they may be considered directly competitive or substitutable if raising taxes on
fish causes consumers to purchase more carrots.
The second step of the Article 111:2 second sentence inquiry is whether the
two pertinent goods are "not similarly taxed., 48 This inquiry is distinct from
Article III:2's first sentence's inquiry into whether the foreign goods were taxed
at a level "in excess of' that of "like" domestic goods. Recall that "in excess of"
does not offer a de minimis defense; the foreign good cannot be taxed at any
non-zero amount more than comparable domestic good. By contrast, "not
similarly taxed" has been interpreted to allow a de minimis defense.49 In order to
violate this step of the second sentence inquiry, the difference in taxation levels
effectively levied on directly competitive or substitutable foreign and domestic
goods must be substantial enough so as to have a material effect on consumer
purchasing decisions.50
The third step of the Article 111:2 second sentence inquiry is whether the
foreign and domestic goods are not similarly taxed in a manner "so as to afford
protection" to domestic production.5' The "so as to afford protection" step is
distinct from the objective border tax adjustments test, which, as described in
Section II.B, does not inquire into the underlying intent of the tax. By contrast,
the key issue in the "so as to afford protection" inquiry is whether the member
state had protectionist intent in promulgating this tax measure.52 The inquiry is
therefore subjective. The WTO usually considers the tax measure's legislative
47 See, for example, Canada-Periodicals, Report of the Appellate Body.
48 Japan-Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body at 26.
49 Id at 27.
50 Id.
51 Id at 28.
52 Id at 27-28.
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history and the text of the tax measure in determining whether this step is
violated.53
In summary, Article 111:2 second sentence's analysis is a well-established
three-step inquiry: (1) whether the products are directly competitive or
substitutable, (2) whether they are not similarly taxed, and (3) whether they are
taxed in a manner meant to afford protection to domestic production. Further,
while analysis of Article 111:2's first sentence shares many of the same
considerations as the second, the two sentences present distinct and separate
requirements. Compared to Article 111:2's first sentence, the second is more
favorable to a complainant nation in some respects and less favorable in others.
The directly competitive or substitutable inquiry is broader than "like" and
therefore easier for the complainant nation to satisfy. However, the latter two
second sentence inquiries offer the defendant nation de minimis and good-faith
defenses and are therefore less favorable to the complainant nation. In any case,
a tax measure must satisfy both sentences to satisfy Article 111:2.
D. EVOLUTION OF ARTICLE 111:2 JURISPRUDENCE AND THE
MODERN TEST
Section II.B discussed the two competing Article 111:2 first sentence
"likeness" tests, namely the objective border tax adjustment factors test and the
more subjective aims and effects test. Over time, the WTO has wavered
between objective and subjective tests in its "likeness" analysis. Since deciding
Chile-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages ("Chile-Alcoholic Beverages") in 1999, the Appellate
Body has employed the border tax adjustment factors test, with the addition of
considering the tax's purpose.5 4 While purpose is part of the Article 111:2 inquiry,
the Appellate Body's current test is not akin to the aims and effects test. Rather,
it has added a fifth factor of purpose to the existing border tax adjustment
factors.
According to Chile-Alcoholic Beverages, purpose is determined entirely by
analyzing the design, architecture, and structure of the tax measure's text.55 The
purpose inquiry therefore differs from the aims prong of the aims and effects
test. As discussed, a tax measure's "aims" are determined by considering the tax
measure's legislative history and text. Chile-Alcoholic Beverages limits the sources
used to determine purpose solely to the tax measure's text, without resorting to
53 Id.
54 Chile--Alcoholc Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body. See also DiMascio and Pauwelyn, 102 Am J
Ind L at 65 (cited in note 4).
55 Chile-Alcohoic Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body 1 62.
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legislative history.5 6 By adopting a textualist approach to determining purpose,
the Appellate Body has reduced the judicial cost and difficulties associated with
investigating legislative history.
In practice, this textualist approach to analyzing purpose results in
upholding taxes that classify products in a graduated manner based on criteria
that directly address legitimate policy goals, and where the differential in taxation
levels between product classes is not drastic. By contrast, taxes that classify
products arbitrarily with stark differences in taxation levels between the product
classes are likely violations of Article 111:2. Consider the tax measure disputed in
Chile-Alcoholic Beverages. A 27 percent value added tax ("VAT") was imposed on
beverages with alcohol content below 20 percent and a 47 percent VAT was
imposed on beverages with alcohol content above 22.3 percent.5 7 The Appellate
Body found the tax's distinction between 20 percent alcohol content and above
22.3 percent alcohol content to be arbitrary and the 20 percent differential in
VATs between beverages separated by only 2.3 percent to be excessive.
Accordingly, the Appellate Body concluded the tax measure had a protectionist
purpose.
In contrast, consider again the gas guzzler tax in US-Autos. The Energy
Tax Act of 1978 imposed a per-vehicle tax on auto manufacturers based on an
automobile's gas mileage.58 Table 1 below shows the tax's product classifications
and associated tax burdens provided by the act as amended in 1990.
56 Id, 1 63.
57 Id, 1-3.
58 US-Autos, Report of the Panel 2.1.
Summer 2009
Liang
Chicago Journal of International Law
Gas Mileage (mpg) Tax Burden ($)
Greater than 22.5 0
21.5 to 22.5 1,000
20.5 to 21.5 1,300
19.5 to 20.5 1,700
18.5 to 19.5 2,100
17.5 to 18.5 2,600
16.5 to 17.5 3,000
15.5 to 16.5 3,700
14.5 to 15.5 4,500
13.5 to 14.5 5,400
12.5 to 13.5 6,400
Less than 12.5 7,700
Table 1: The US Gas Guzzler Tax
5 9
The WTO Dispute Panel concluded based on the tax measure's design and
structure that the gas guzzler tax did not have a protectionist intent, but was
genuinely motivated by environmental and energy independence concerns.60
Automobiles were classified by gas mileage, a criteria that directly addresses
concerns over fuel efficiency and emission levels. The classifications were
gradual with 1.0 mpg increments and there were twelve classifications. Tax rates
were similarly graduated between classification levels. These graduated
classifications were unlike the sudden thresholds found in Chile-Alcoholic
Beverages. Further, at the time of the original 1978 act, the majority of domestic
US-produced vehicles would have been subject to the tax.6' The fact that the
1990 amendment seemed to build upon the 1978 act suggested a concerted long-
term effort to address environmental and energy concerns.
Thus, the WTO's current test on Article 111:2 is likely governed by the
objective border tax adjustment factors, with the added consideration of the
disputed tax measure's purpose. The border tax adjustment factors assess
whether the tax will impose a larger tax burden on imports. The purpose prong
asks whether the tax has a graduated progression of tax rates based on product
classifications that directly address legitimate policy goals, or instead, creates
59 Id, T 2.7.
60 Id, 1 5.26.
61 Id, T 3.200.
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arbitrary product distinctions and imposes starkly different tax rates based on
these distinctions.
III. GATT ARTICLE XX
Article XX of the GATT provides member states with a list of enumerated
exemptions from compliance with other GATT provisions, including Article
111:2. Article XX is organized into two parts. First, the chapeau narrows the
applicability of Article XX's exemptions so as to prevent abuse of Article XX's
enumerated exemptions. Following the chapeau is the enumerated list of
exemptions, running (a) through 0).62
The purpose of Article XX is to provide member states with exemptions
from GATT requirements where the member state's national interest would be
unfairly and excessively burdened by having to comply with those
requirements.63 In effect, Article XX offers defendant member states an
affirmative defense in WTO disputes.64 Whether a member state qualifies for an
Article XX defense against an Article 111:2 complaint is a two-step inquiry: (1)
whether the member state's tax measure meets the objectives of the asserted
enumerated exemption; and (2) whether the tax measure meets the requirements
of Article XX's chapeau.
65
Given this Comment's focus on environmentally motivated green tax
measures, the enumerated defenses in Article XX(b) and Article XX(g) are
relevant. Together, these defenses form the "environmental exemptions" of
Article XX. Section III.A compares Articles XX(b) and XX(g). Section III.B
discusses the requirements of Article XX's chapeau.
A. ARTICLE XX(G) OFFERS A MORE LIKELY EXCEPTION THAN
ARTICLE XX(B)
Though Articles XX(b) and XX(g) both provide environmental
exemptions and nothing stops a defendant member state from asserting both
defenses together, an affirmative defense using Article XX(g) is more likely to
succeed in a dispute over a green tax. Article XX(b) provides an exemption from
all other GATT provisions-including Article 111:2-where the disputed policy
is "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health. 66 Article XX(g)
provides an exemption to Article 111:2 where the disputed tax measure is
62 GATT, art XX.
63 Quick and Lau, 6 J Ind Econ L at 455 (cited in note 32).
64 Bhala, 9 J Trans L & Poly at 24 (cited in note 19).
65 Quick and Lau, 6 J Ind Econ L at 438 (cited in note 32).
66 GATT, art XX(b).
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"relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures
are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption."67
Note that Article XX(g) uses the language "relating to," while Article
XX(b) uses the language "necessary to." According to the panel decision in
Argentina-Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and the Import of Finished
Leather,68 the "necessary to" standard requires that the defendant state's disputed
policy address an urgent problem requiring immediate remedy.69 The defendant
state must meet the burden of proving that no alternative policy measures,
which would not violate other GATT provisions, are feasible.0 By contrast, in
US-Autos, the Dispute Panel distinguished "relating to" as a more relaxed
standard when compared to the "necessary to" standard.7 All that is required to
satisfy the "relating to" standard is for the member state asserting an XX(g)
affirmative defense to prove the disputed policy is "primarily aimed" at resolving
the environmental problem.72 The environmental problem addressed by the tax
need not be urgent and it is immaterial whether alternative policy remedies that
do not violate other GATT provisions are feasible.73
The Dispute Panel in US-Autos laid out the following three-step test for
assessing compliance with Article XX(g): (1) whether the policy alleged to be
promoted by the disputed tax measure falls within XX(g)'s scope, (2) whether
the tax measure is sufficiently related to the policy, and (3) whether the tax
measure complies with Article XX's chapeau. 74 The Panel considered "clean air"
an exhaustible natural resource under Article XX(g). Thus, improving air
quality satisfies the first step of the inquiry, since the policy of conserving clean
air falls within Article XX(g)'s scope. In US-Autos, the Panel found that the US's
Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency regulation, which sought to improve fuel
efficiency and reduce emissions, satisfied the second step.76 That is, regulations
which improve fuel efficiency and lower emissions of air pollutants were
67 GATT, art XX(g).
68 World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel, Arentina-Measures Affecting the Eport of Bovine
Hides and the Import of Finished Leather, WTO Doc No WT/DS1 55/R (Jan 5, 2001).
69 Id, 11.299-11.308 (the case actually concerned Article XX(d), but this exemption uses the
same "necessary to" language).
70 Ahn, 20 Mich J Intl L at 828 (cited in note 8).
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sufficiently related to the purported policy of improving clean air. The third step,
compliance with Article XX's chapeau, is discussed in greater detail below. The
point is, though, that compliance with the enumerated Article XX(g) exemption
is not difficult to achieve. Any tax likely to significantly improve air quality by
improving energy efficiency and reducing emissions of air pollutants should
qualify.
B. ARTICLE XX CHAPEAU
Article XX's chapeau is intended to prevent abuse of Article XX's
enumerated exemptions.77 All of Article XX's enumerated exemptions are
subject to Article XX's chapeau.7 ' Article XX's chapeau states:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised
restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party
of [the following] measures[.]71
The chapeau prevents Article XX from becoming a means of circumventing the
GATT's other provisions by pretending protectionist policies are actually based
on urgent and important national interests. There are two tests to determine
whether a measure impermissibly circumvents other GATT provisions and
therefore violates the chapeau: the "discrimination test" and the "disguised
restriction" test.
United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products ("US-
Shrimp")8° provides the two-step inquiry for the discrimination test: (1)
application of the measure in question must result in discrimination arbitrary or
unjustifiable in character, and (2) discrimination must occur between countries
where the same conditions apply.81 The first step of the discrimination test
evaluates the severity of the discrimination. The arbitrary prong evaluates
procedural discrimination.8 2 A tax results in arbitrary discrimination if, as
77 Ahn, 20 Mich J Intl L at 833-34 (cited in note 8); Quick and Lau, 6 J Intl Econ L at 439 (cited in
note 32).
78 Ahn, 20 Mich J Intl L at 833 (cited in note 8).
79 GATT, art XX.
80 World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc No WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct 12 1998) C'US-Shrimp").
81 Id, 148-50. See also Julia Ya Qin, Defining Nondiscrimination under the Law of the World Trade
Organization, 23 BU Intl LJ 215, 269 (2005).
82 Chamovitz, 27 Yale J Intl L at 96 (cited in note 42).
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implemented, the tax lacks transparency or due process. 3 For example, in US-
Shrimp, the disputed policy was a US administrative procedure which granted
certification to certain nations' shrimp imports.8 4 The Appellate Body found the
administrative procedure lacked transparency and due process since the
administrative officials did not have to disclose the rationale for their decisions
on whether to grant certification. 5 As implemented, certification results
demonstrated a lack of consistency or clear decisionmaking criteria. 6 The
"unjustifiable in character" prong of step one evaluates substantive
discrimination. A policy or tax measure is unjustifiable if it is coercive, unilateral,
rigid, and inflexible.87 These adjectives suggest that unjustifiable discrimination
refers to a severe level of discriminatory effect, greater than that required for a
finding of an Article 111:2 violation.8 Thus, while Article XX's enumerated
exemptions allow for some discrimination, the "unjustifiable" prong of the
chapeau provides an outer bound on the level of discriminatory effect.
The second step of the discrimination test is to determine if the
discrimination applies to "countries where the same conditions prevail." US-
Shrimp suggests that this inquiry stands for the proposition that member states,
prior to promulgating a policy that may be discriminatory in effect and in
violation of GATT, must consider the conditions prevailing in other member
states.89 That is, the promulgating nation must account for the circumstances
and views of other member states that may be discriminated against by the
policy.90 In US-Shrimp, the Appellate Body found that the US failed to comply
with the chapeau partly because the US did not consult with other member
states about the potential discriminatory effect of its certification procedure.9'
The rationale for the "same conditions" prong is to minimize the discriminatory
effect of policies by encouraging member states to negotiate ex ante.92 As a
general matter, the WTO prefers regulations that are a product of multilateral
negotiation, rather than unilateral measures. Forcing multilateral negotiation
should ensure that the disputed measure is not more discriminatory than
83 Id.
84 US-Shrimp, Report of the Appellate Body 183-84.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id, 161-76; Qin, 23 BU Intl LJ 215 at 269 (cited in note 81).
88 See Qin, 23 BU Intl LJ 215 at 269 (cited in note 81).
89 US-Shrimp, Report of the Appellate Body 54.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id; Ahn, 20 Mich J Intl L at 833 (cited in note 8).
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necessary. At the very least, obligatory consultation guarantees that other
member states have an opportunity to approve of the disputed measure.
In addition to the discrimination test, to comply with Article XX's
chapeau, a measure also cannot constitute a "disguised restriction on
international trade." The "disguised restriction" requirement is similar to the
"aims" prong of the (now defunct) aims and effects test of Article 111:2. It bars
measures which have protectionist intent.93 This prong is sensible given the
chapeau's objective of presenting abuse of Article XX. Legislative history and
the text of the disputed policy are viable sources to determine if a policy is a
"disguised restriction on international trade." 94 In US-Shrimp, the Appellate
Body found the disputed policy was not a disguised restriction because: (1)
environmental groups initiated the policy, (2) US producers were subject to
comparable constraints, and (3) US producers gained little commercially due to
the policy.95 The policy therefore lacked protectionist intent. Note, a measure
can be considered a "disguised restriction" if the promulgating nation was
negligent about the protectionist effects of the measure.96 In other words, a
measure can be a disguised restriction if the promulgating nation knew or had
reason to know that the disputed policy risked having discriminatory effect, yet
implemented the policy anyway.97 Note further that both Article XX's chapeau
and Article 111:2 (at least the second sentence since the first sentence now uses
the border tax adjustment factors and disregards discriminatory intent) test for
discriminatory intent. It may seem redundant or odd that qualifying for an
Article XX exception requires compliance with Article 111:2, the very provision
from which an exception is sought. However, Article XX is an exception not
just from Article 111:2, but all other GATT provisions. In addition, an Article
111:2 violation could arise for any number of reasons, discriminatory intent only
being one of them, in which case Article XX's chapeau further assures that the
disputed measure is not motivated by protectionist objectives.
In summary, Article XX of the GATT provides member states with
exemptions from other GATT provisions. Given this Comment's focus on
environmentally motivated "green" taxes, Article XX(b) and XX(g)'s exemptions
offer the most likely defenses. Article XX(g) is more promising to the defendant
93 Qin, 23 BU Intl J 215 at 267-68 (cited in note 81).
94 Id.
95 Laurent A. Ruessmann, Putting the Precautionay Principle in its Place: Parameters for the Proper Application
of a Precautionay Approach and the Implications for Developing Countries in Lght of the DOHA WTO
Ministerial, 17 Am U Intl L Rev 905, 923-24 (2002); World Trade Organization, Report of the
Panel, US-Shrimp 5.143, WTO Doc No WT/DS58/R (May 15, 1998).
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nation because it only requires that the disputed tax measure be "related to"
environmental and resource conservation. Assuming the tax measure qualifies
for Article XX(g)'s exemption, the tax measure also needs to satisfy Article XX's
chapeau. First, the tax measure must not result in arbitrary (procedural) or
unjustifiable (substantive) discrimination against other countries where the same
conditions prevail. Second, the tax measure must not be a disguised restriction
on trade, meaning the tax measure must not be motivated by protectionist
objectives. If the tax measure meets both Article XX(g) and the chapeau's
requirements, the tax measure is exempt from Article 111:2 requirements and will
be upheld as compliant with GATT's provisions.
IV. THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: LENIENCY FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES
A review of WTO jurisprudence reveals increasing acknowledgement of
the "precautionary principle."98 In the context of WTO disputes and
environmental issues, the precautionary principle permits a defendant nation to
claim the existence of an environmental risk, even if this environmental risk has
not been acknowledged by scientific unanimity or even by a majority of the
scientific community. 99 Further, a nation may allege the existence of an
environmental risk even if the severity and probability of the risk cannot be
quantified. °° In effect, the precautionary principle eases the burden of proof on
WTO members in asserting an affirmative defense on environmental grounds.
Scientific certainty of the environmental risk is unnecessary. All that is required
is for the allegation of the environmental risk to be based on good-faith reliance
on scientific analysis and opinion.101 The rationale guiding the precautionary
principle is that environmental risks are too grave to require certainty of
information.1
0 2
The precautionary principle should make it easier for defendant nations to
assert an Article XX(b) or XX(g) defense on environmental grounds. For
98 Marie-Claire C. Segger and Markus W. Gehring, Precaution, Health and the World Trade OtaniZation:
Moving toward Sustainable Development, 29 Queen's L J 133, 135 (2003) (note however, that the WTO
has not formally recognized or adopted the precautionary principle but their recent jurisprudence
suggests they are inclined to grant greater deference to environmentally motivated policies).
99 Id at 135; World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, European Community--Measures
Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products 178, WTO Doc No WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar 12,
2001) ("EC-Asbestos).
100 Segger and Gehring, 29 Queen's L J at 135 (cited in note 98); EC-Asbestos, Report of the
Appellate Body 178.
101 Segger and Gehring, 29 Queen's L J at 135 (cited in note 98); EC-Asbestos, Report of the
Appellate Body 178.
102 Segger and Gehring, 29 Queen's LJ at 135 (cited in note 98).
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example, a member state passing a tax on fuel consumption need not prove with
high certainty that air quality will necessarily decrease if the tax is not
implemented. The member state also need not attempt to quantify the likelihood
or severity of the decrease in air quality. The precautionary principle will justify
the member state's assertion of an environmental risk so long as the assertion is
based on the view of a substantial segment (not necessarily a majority) of the
scientific community."0 3 More importantly, the precautionary principle's modern
prevalence suggests that the WTO gives significant weight to environmental
considerations in its policies and disputes.
In European Communi-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing
Products ("EC-Asbestos"), the Appellate Body stated that whether an Article XX
exemption (environmentally motivated or not) should be granted depends on
the following factors: (1) the importance of the common interests and values
protected, (2) the likely efficacy of the measure, and (3) the level of market
impact on trade flows. 104 Professor Joost Pauwelyn argues that an environmental
measure is likely to receive Article XX protection if (1) the environmental risk is
globally established, (2) the environmental measure is facially neutral, (3) there is
a nexus between the environmental risk and the regulating nation, and (4) there
is a nexus between the environmental risk and the environmental measure.
1°5
Taken together, EC-Asbestos and Pauwelyn's analysis suggest that the
WTO uses a two-step process to evaluate whether an environmental measure
qualifies for an Article XX(b) or XX(g) defense. First, the WTO examines the
environmental risk that the measure purports to address. A defense is certain if
the environmental risk is globally established and known. Second, the
environmental measure itself is examined. In the Article 111:2 context, a tax is
more likely to receive Article XX protection if the tax directly and effectively
remedies the alleged environmental risk. The tax measure's directness and
effectiveness are balanced against any finding that the tax fails to comply with
Article XX.
V. SUMMARY OF RELEVANT FACTORS
Up to this point, this Comment has discussed the WTO's treatment of
Article 111:2, Article XX, and the precautionary principle. In each discussion, the
Comment sought to extract and simplify the relevant tests, factors, and
considerations that the WTO has developed. This section merges these findings
103 Ruessmann, 17 Am U Ind L Rev at 915-16 (cited in note 95).
104 Id.
105 Joost Pauwelyn, Recent Books on Trade and Environment: GATE Phantoms Still Haunt the WFTO, 15 Eur
J Intl L 575, 587 (2004).
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and proposes the framework that the WTO Dispute Body should employ to
adjudicate future disputes concerning facially neutral tax measures that are
motivated by environmental and energy conservation concerns. Figure 1
presents a flowchart of the step-by-step test of how the WTO should adjudicate
future disputes concerning facially neutral "green taxes," like the engine size tax
proposed by China. The details of each inquiry in the step-by-step test were
discussed in depth in Sections II and III. However, for the purposes of
understanding how these inquiries fit together in the larger WTO test, a
summary of each inquiry follows.
In short, the first threshold inquiry is whether the green tax complies with
Article 111:2. To comply with Article 111:2, the green tax must comply with both
Article III:2's first and second sentences. Compliance with Article III:2's first
sentence generally turns on whether the domestic and foreign products in
dispute are in fact "like." Likeness is determined by (1) the objective border tax
adjustment factors and (2) the purpose of the tax measure. The four border tax
adjustment factors, listed in Figure 1, together seek to determine whether the
green tax is likely to impose a higher tax burden on foreign goods as compared
to domestic goods. Two products are more apt to be considered "like" if a
discriminatory effect is probable. If the purpose of the green tax is found to be
protectionist, then this also favors finding "likeness." The purpose of the green
tax is determined by analyzing the tax measure's structure and design. A green
tax which contains arbitrary product classifications with drastic differences in
taxation levels is more likely to be considered protectionist in purpose and
therefore in violation of Article 111:2 first sentence. Assuming two products are
"like," an Article 111:2 first sentence violation is almost certain since the "in
excess of" language does not offer a de minimis defense.
A green tax violates the second sentence of Article 111:2 if: (1) the pertinent
products are directly competitive or substitutable; and (2) the products are "not
similarly taxed" so as to afford protection to domestic products. If a green tax
does not violate either the first or second sentence of Article 111:2, then it is in
compliance with the GATT and the inquiry ends. However, if a green tax
violates either sentence, the tax violates Article 111:2. The promulgating state is
likely, then, to assert an affirmative defense using Article XX(g) on
environmental grounds.
Vol. 10 No. 1
Green Taxes and the WITO
Precautionary Principle -> scientific consensusend quantification unnecessary to assert
environmental risk
SXX(b):"necessayto protect... life"
SXX(g: "related to [conserving resources]"
General Chapeau Factors:
1 .Arbitrary (procedural) or unjustifiable
(substantive) discrimination where "same
conditions" (i.e. ex ante consultation); or
2. "dis guis ed" -> protectionist intent
Environmental Chap e au F actors:
1 .Globally known/established environmental
risk
2.Efficacy and directness of the tax in
remedying the environmental risk
No Article XX exemption. Tax
violates GAT T
A. ARTICLE M:2 INQUIRY
J71
Figure 1: Multifactor Test Flowchart
Whether a green tax is entitled to an Article XX exemption depends on
first, whether the green tax satisfies the requirements of one of Article XX's
enumerated provisions and second, whether the green tax satisfies the
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requirements of Article XX's chapeau. To satisfy Article XX(g), a green tax need
only have a nexus to the environmental problem it seeks to remedy. Further, the
WTO has ruled that "clean air" is an exhaustible resource within the meaning of
Article XX(g), which opens the door for taxes that seek to improve fuel
efficiency and air quality and decrease emissions. °6 The precautionary principle
also eases the burden of proving the existence of the environmental risk. If a
green tax meets Article XX(g)'s requirements, then the final hurdle to GATT
compliance is whether the green tax satisfies Article XX's chapeau limitations.
The chapeau bars green taxes that lead to (1) arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail or (2) the
green tax serves as a disguised trade restriction.
The WTO's adoption of the precautionary principle and Appellate Body's
discussion in EC-Asbeslos signal that environmental considerations may be given
greater weight in future Dispute Body proceedings. Specifically, where (1) the
environmental risk which the green tax purports to address is established as a
matter of common global concern (for example, global warming), and (2) the
green tax is direct and effective in addressing the environmental risk, the green
tax will likely receive an Article XX exemption despite not strictly meeting
chapeau requirements. The Dispute Body may use the foregoing two
environmental factors in green tax disputes, as additional considerations in
assessing whether a green tax complies with the chapeau.
VI. THE CHINA ENGINE SIZE TAX AS A HYPOTHETICAL TEST
CASE
With increasing global concern over declining environmental protection,
global warming, and energy shortages, it is anticipated that many nations will
promulgate tax measures motivated by such concerns. These green taxes may
create friction with WTO obligations. The previously discussed US gas guzzler
tax, disputed in US-Autos, is just one example of a green tax creating friction
with GATT provisions.
On August 21, 2008, China passed its own version of the gas guzzler tax
("engine size tax") l.'0 The measure imposes varying tax rates depending on a
vehicle's engine size, measured in liters.0 8 About a month earlier, on July 18,
2008, China lost its first WTO legal dispute. The WTO struck down a Chinese
tax measure, which imposed a special 25 percent tariff on imported car parts,
instead of the standard 10 percent rate, if the imported car parts made up more
106 US-Autos, Report of the Panel 3.316-3.323.
107 Car Taxes in China, The Economist (cited in note 1).
108 Id.
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than half the value of the vehicle. ° 9 The car parts tax was meant to encourage
foreign automakers to use local suppliers and reduce imports."0 A month later,
on August 21, 2008, China promulgated the engine size tax at issue. The engine
size tax provides the following tax brackets:
Vehicle Engine Size (liters) Tax Rate
4.1 or greater 40 percent
3.0 to 4.1 25 percent
1.0 to 3.0 8 to 10 percent
Less than 1.0 1 percent
Table 2: China's Engine Size Tax"'
China couched the engine size tax as a green tax.1 2 Typically larger engines
have lower fuel economy. By taxing larger engine vehicles at a higher rate, the
hope is that consumers will purchase smaller engine vehicles with higher fuel
efficiency and lower emissions. In light of China's burgeoning economy, energy
efficiency is of the utmost concern. China's environmental record has been very
poor, with cities suffering from dangerous levels of smog and pollutants."3 Of
course, the engine size tax is not facially discriminatory, in contrast to China's
car part import tax, which was previously struck down by the WTO. On its face
then, the engine size tax is a domestic measure intended to serve laudable policy
goals of environmental protection and energy efficiency.
As it turns out, the engine size tax disproportionately affects imports. The
majority of large engine cars, those that will fit in the upper two tax brackets
(taxed at 25 percent and 40 percent), are imports. Meanwhile, the majority of
small engine cars are domestically produced. The market impact and dilemma is
therefore identical to that discussed in the US gas guzzler tax dispute, where a
facially neutral tax placed a larger tax burden on imports than on domestic
products. Thus, while there is no facial or de jure discrimination, the engine size
tax is de facto discriminatory and an Article 111:2 challenge could be raised. In





113 Joseph Khan and Jim Yardley, As China Roars, Pollution Reaches Deadly Extremes, NY Times (Aug
26, 2007), available online at <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/26/world/asia/26china.html>
(visited Apr 22, 2009).
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tax just a month following the WTO's rejection of its car part tax. Inferably,
China is simply using the engine size tax to achieve the same protectionist goals
as its car parts tax, in effect circumventing the WTO's decision striking down
the car parts tax on Article 111:2 grounds.
It was widely anticipated, at the time of the engine size tax's
announcement, that China's engine size tax would face WTO opposition.14 At
the time of this writing, no WTO complaint has been filed. However, a future
complaint is still possible and, given Article 111:2 precedent, may well prove
successful. The following sections apply the proposed test from Section V to
determine how the WTO should adjudicate a hypothetical dispute concerning
the engine size tax. The reader may find it helpful to refer to Figure 1 to follow
the steps of the analysis. Sections VI.A and VI.B will argue that the WTO
should find that the engine size tax violates Article 111:2's first sentence, but is
entitled to an Article XX(g) exemption due to its environmental and
conservation benefits. China's engine size tax should therefore be upheld as in
compliance with the GATT.
A. THE CHINA ENGINE SIZE TAX LIKELY VIOLATES
ARTICLE 111:2
The WTO should find that the engine size tax violates Article III:2's first
sentence. Article 111:2's first sentence analysis here turns on whether the WTO
will find large engine vehicles, primarily imported, are "like" smaller engine
vehicles, which are primarily domestic. Using the border tax adjustment factors,
large and small engine vehicles are "like." They have the same end uses and are
competing goods with, other than engine size, similar physical characteristics and
qualities. It is unlikely that car buyers make purchasing decisions directly based
on engine size.
The best argument against finding "likeness" is that engine size is typically
a proxy for other vehicle characteristics. Larger engine vehicles tend to be larger,
heavier, and have worse fuel economy "unlike" smaller engine vehicles.
However, I believe this argument is unavailing. First, consumers frequently
choose between larger and smaller vehicles. They are competing products
despite their differences in size and fuel economy. There is not a separate market
for cars of differing sizes. Second, there is no necessary correlation between
engine size and vehicle size. For example, many sports cars are small and
lightweight but have large engines. On the basis of the border tax adjustment
factors then, small and large engine vehicles are "like." Therefore, the tax will
114 Car Taxes in China, The Economist (cited in note 1).
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lead to a disproportionately higher tax burden on imports, which tend to have
larger engines in comparison to domestic Chinese vehicles.
The modern "like" analysis also requires a determination of the tax
measure's purpose, as determined by analyzing the text of the tax measure, its
design and structure. If a tax measure creates arbitrary classifications with drastic
differences in tax rates between classifications, then the WTO is more likely to
find the tax has a protectionist purpose. By contrast, a tax measure with
graduated tax brackets is more likely to be upheld by the WTO. Applying the
purpose analysis for the engine tax does not lead to a clear conclusion. On the
one hand, classifying vehicles by engine size is non-arbitrary. Taxing by engine
size suggests intent to discourage production and consumption of large engine
vehicles, which have lower fuel economy and higher emissions. On the other
hand, the engine size tax only creates four categories, with drastic differences in
tax rates (10 to 15 percent differences between categories, varying from a
negligible 1 percent tax rate to a punitive 40 percent rate). However, the tax
measure is less suspect than that found in Chile-Alcoholic Beverages where
alcoholic beverages separated by 2.3 percent in alcohol content were separated
by 20 percent in tax rates. The WTO will likely conduct a market analysis to
check if the engine size cutoffs coincide with points at which imported vehicles
become more or less common. For example, if foreign imports are suddenly
more prevalent in the market at the 3.0 liter or 4.1 liter cutoff points, the WTO
may find a protectionist purpose.
Given that the border tax adjustment factors favor a finding of "likeness"
and the purpose inquiry is not dispositive, overall the WTO is likely to find the
vehicles covered by the engine size tax are "like." Since there is no de minimis
defense for the first sentence and the engine size tax will tax foreign vehicles in
an amount "in excess of... like" domestic vehicles, the engine size tax violates
Article 111:2 first sentence. Because violating either of the two sentences of
Article 111:2 leads to an Article 111:2 violation, it is unnecessary to check if the
engine size tax violates Article III:2's second sentence.
The result here may seem at odds with US-Autos. The gas guzzler tax in
that dispute classified vehicles by gas mileage. The Dispute Panel found that the
tax did not violate Article 111:2 and served non-protectionist objectives of
improving fuel efficiency and environmental protections. There are two key
distinctions between US-Autos and this hypothetical engine size dispute. First, in
US-Autos, the Dispute Panel did not use the border tax adjustment factors to
determine "likeness." Rather, the panel employed the more subjective aims and
effects test. The aims and effects test has been debunked since 1995 when the
Appellate Body was established. Since that time, the more objective border tax
adjustment factors have been used to assess "likeness." Second, the gas guzzler
tax featured far more graduated classifications (twelve categories in total),
suggesting its objectives were indeed non-protectionist. Further, it might be
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argued that engine size is not as direct a proxy of fuel emissions and efficiency as
gas mileage in US-Autos or other measures, such as carbon dioxide emissions.
China could easily have chosen to design its tax using these more direct
measures. Its choice of engine size as the basis for classification weakens its
argument that the tax has a non-protectionist purpose.
China's engine size tax is therefore in violation of Article 111:2. China will
likely assert an Article XX affirmative defense. An analysis of whether the engine
size tax is entitled to an Article XX exemption follows.
B. THE CHINA ENGINE SIZE TAX LIKELY RECEIVES AN
ARTICLE XX(G) EXEMPTION
The WTO should grant China's engine size tax an Article XX(g) exemption
and uphold the tax measure. In reaching this decision, the WTO should first
consider whether the engine size tax qualifies under any of Article XX's
enumerated exemptions, and second, whether the tax satisfies Article XX's
chapeau.
The engine size tax will likely meet Article XX(g)'s requirements. Articles
XX(b) and XX(g) together embody the environmental exemption to the GATT.
As discussed in Section I1, Article XX(g)'s requirements are easier to satisfy
than Article XX(b). Article XX(g), with its "relating to" language, merely
requires a nexus between the disputed tax measure and the policy goal it seeks to
achieve, in this case conserving clean air. Unlike Article XX(b) and its "necessary
to" language, Article XX(g) does not require that the tax measure be the only
feasible means of addressing the environmental risk and the environmental risk
need not be urgent. Per the precautionary principle, China need not quantify or
prove by scientific unanimity or majority consensus the existence of the
environmental risk. In a nutshell, Article XX(g) does not provide very stringent
requirements. China will probably argue that the engine size tax conserves "clean
air," which the WTO in US-Autos,"5 found was an exhaustible resource under
Article XX(g). With respect to proving the environmental risk, China might cite
studies and data demonstrating poor air quality in its major urban centers. Given
that large engine vehicles tend to have worse fuel economy and higher
emissions, there is an obvious nexus between the engine size tax and its
purported policy objective of conserving clean air. Therefore, China's engine
size tax should satisfy Article XX(g)'s requirements. To receive an Article XX
exemption, the engine size tax must also comply with Article XX's chapeau. The
next step then is to determine whether the engine size tax satisfies Article XX's
chapeau limitations.
115 US-Autos, Report of the Panel 1 3.316-3.323.
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The WTO should conclude the engine size tax fails to satisfy Article XX's
chapeau limitations on grounds that it creates arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between nations where the same conditions prevail. Arbitrary
discrimination is not relevant here since the tax depends purely on objective
factors (in other words, engine size) and is not applied on a discretionary basis.
Whether the tax creates unjustifiable discrimination will depend on the findings
of a market impact analysis. If the disproportion is sufficiently severe as to be
considered coercive, then the tax creates unjustifiable discrimination. Market
impact depends on (1) what percentage are imports and what percentage are
domestic for each of the four engine size classifications, and (2) the differential
in tax burdens between classifications. The first factor will require investigation.
If it turns out a large proportion of large engine vehicles are imported (for
example, over 50 percent) while a small proportion of small engine vehicles are
imported (for example, less than 2 percent), then this favors finding unjustifiable
discrimination. The second factor is known based on the provided tax rates.
Here, the differential in tax burden is high, varying from a negligible 1 percent
rate to a punitive 40 percent rate. Assuming an investigation of the first factor
reveals that imports are sufficiently more likely to be burdened by the higher tax
brackets, the WTO should find unjustifiable discrimination.
Per US-Shrimp, the "same conditions" prong of the chapeau requires the
promulgating nation to take into account the conditions and interests of other
member states. The prong stands for the proposition that nations, prior to
promulgating policies that are potentially discriminative, should provide notice
and conduct good-faith consultations with other member states. China
promulgated this tax measure suddenly and without prior notice or consultation
with other WTO member states. This favors finding noncompliance with the
chapeau's "same conditions" prong, and thus weighs against granting an Article
XX exemption.
Article XX's chapeau also prohibits tax measures that are disguised
restrictions on trade. This factor addresses the issue of intent and asks whether
the tax measure was intended to achieve protectionist goals despite being
couched as addressing non-protectionist concerns. The facts here are not
dispositive. China announced the engine size tax just one month after its car part
tax was struck down by the WTO. This fact, combined with the tax's likely
disproportionate impact on imports, suggests the engine size tax was intended
purely to circumvent the WTO's ruling on the car part tax. Such a result is
precisely what the disguised restriction requirement seeks to prevent. However,
China has a strong case that its engine size tax is not intended to circumvent the
WTO's ruling. First, the single fact that the engine size tax was passed a month
after the WTO struck down the car part tax cannot be considered direct
evidence that the engine size tax was intended to circumvent the WTO's ruling.
Second, China's poor environmental record and air quality is globally recognized
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and a problem China's national government has made a priority. The passage of
this engine size tax would appear to directly remedy this problem. Third, the
engine size tax does not directly replace the car part tax. The two measures are
not mutually exclusive and could exist alongside each other. The engine size tax
pursues entirely different objectives from the car part import tax. Fourth, if
China is able to demonstrate that the engine size tax does not result in
discrimination against imported vehicles, or at least not nearly to the same extent
as the car part tax, then this counters the argument that the engine size tax is
meant to achieve the same protectionist goals as the car part tax. Overall, the
WTO should find that the engine size tax violates the chapeau's traditional
requirements. The tax creates unjustifiable discrimination between nations where
the same conditions prevail.
However, because the engine size tax is a green tax, the Dispute Body will
consider the two environmental factors discussed in Section V. The first
question is whether the environmental risks, which the green tax purports to
remedy, are globally established and acknowledged. The pertinent environmental
risks here all relate to the effects of fossil fuel emissions, such as poor air quality
and global warming. Additionally, the engine size tax should reduce demand for
fossil fuel energy. These risks are all globally recognized." 6 Hazardous air quality
may be a more uniquely Chinese concern, but it is a problem to which the
international community is attuned.
The second question is whether the engine size tax directly and effectively
addresses the environmental risk. The directness requirement is likely satisfied.
There is a sufficient nexus between discouraging production of large engine
vehicles, which will reduce emissions, and improving air quality, reducing the
global warming phenomena, and reducing demand for fossil fuels. Complainant
nations may argue that engine size is not the most direct means of reducing
emissions, and that a tax on emissions or gas mileage would be more direct.
However, China would likely successfully counter that (1) the nexus between the
engine size tax and the environmental risks is sufficient to satisfy the directness
prong, regardless of whether alternative tax measures are arguably more direct,
and (2) the engine size tax is cheaper to administer as compared to gas mileage
or fuel emission based taxes, and is perhaps less prone to circumvention from
auto manufacturers. The effectiveness prong is likely satisfied as well. The tax's
wide gulf in rates, varying from 1 percent to 40 percent, should provide a strong
impetus for domestic manufacturers to produce smaller engine vehicles, and
foreign manufacturers to export smaller engine vehicles to China. Ironically, the
116 Elizabeth Rosenthal and Andrew C. Revkin, Science Panel Calls Global Warming 'Unequivocal', NY
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drastic differential in tax rates, which previously favored finding an Article 111:2
violation and unjustifiable discrimination in the Article XX inquiry, may weigh in
China's favor here with respect to environmental factors.
In summary, China's engine size tax should be upheld by the WTO. The
tax appears to violate Article 111:2 and does not strictly satisfy Article XX's
requirements. However, because the engine size tax is a green tax, the WTO will
consider the environmental benefit of the tax. These environmental factors
weigh in favor of granting an Article XX(g) exemption. This hypothetical
example suggests that the majority of facially neutral and environmentally
motivated taxes should receive an Article XX exemption in future disputes.
China's engine size tax is actually a difficult case due to its unique facts. China
promulgated the engine size tax just one month after its car part tax was struck
down, creating suspicion that the tax was meant to circumvent the WTO's
ruling. Furthermore, China's engine size tax creates drastic differences in tax
burdens, which suggests the tax has protectionist purposes and may lead to a
finding that the tax results in unjustifiable discrimination per Article XX's
chapeau. Future WTO disputes alleging a green tax violates Article 111:2 are
unlikely to contain these two factual characteristics. The WTO, then, should
uphold most green taxes as in compliance with the GATT.
VII. CONCLUSION
The WTO's existing jurisprudence indicates no clear guidelines or per se
rules on whether internal taxes that are facially neutral, but potentially
discriminatory in effect, violate Article 111:2 of the GATT. The confusion over
Article 111:2's treatment of such taxes is problematic. In coming years, it is
anticipated that many WTO countries will promulgate green taxes as a means of
improving environmental protections and encouraging energy conservation.
Many of these green taxes could disproportionately affect imports relative to
domestically produced goods. If the WTO finds that many green taxes do
violate Article 111:2, this may place an undue and burdensome limitation on
nations' autonomy to pursue legitimate domestic objectives of environmental
protection and energy conservation. However, if the WTO establishes a per se
rule that all facially neutral green taxes comply with Article 111:2, member states
may couch protectionist tax measures as environmentally motivated.
This Comment proposed a framework for the WTO to use in adjudicating
future disputes concerning green taxes. Section II fleshed out relevant
considerations the WTO will employ in determining a tax's compliance with
Article 111:2. Section III examined the WTO's jurisprudence on Article XX.
Section IV presented the precautionary principle and its implications for future
green tax disputes. Section V merged the previous three sections and proposed
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the test the WTO Dispute Body will likely employ in adjudicating future green
tax disputes.
Section VI applied the proposed test from Section V to a hypothetical
dispute concerning China's recently announced engine size tax. The specific
finding of Section VI was that the WTO should find that the engine size tax
violates Article 111:2 but should grant an Article XX(g) exemption due to its
expected effectiveness in combating recognized environmental risks, including
poor air quality and global warming. The broader conclusion of Section VI and
this Comment was that green taxes should be upheld in future WTO disputes.
The WTO is an international organization sensitive to modern policy concerns
and the shared needs of its member states. The WTO's recent jurisprudence and
adoption of the precautionary principle signal the WTO's willingness to
accommodate national policies addressing environmental and conservation
concerns. The WTO is unlikely to intrude into member nation's autonomy when
their policies address these legitimate policy goals.
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